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THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION: HAS § 1506 BEEN A
SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE IN AIDING FOREIGN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS?

Omer Shahid

INTRODUCTION
As the economy has become more globalized, there has been an
apparent need to address instances of cross-border insolvency. Recognizing the
problems associated with such a rapid globalization in the areas of international
trade and investment, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
("Model Law") on May 30, 1997 in order to provide a guideline for national
insolvency laws that may be incapable of dealing effectively with financially
distressed businesses operating on the international level. 1 Among the issues
the Model Law is aimed at addressing are "cases where the insolvent debtor has
assets in more than one State or where some of the creditors of the debtor are
not from the State where the insolvency proceeding is taking place." 2 By
providing a framework that will better equip national insolvency laws to
confront and resolve insolvency cases of a cross-border nature, the Model
Law's goal is to provide a predictable, smooth, and easy way for courts of
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1 See generally UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BRODER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 9-13 (1997), available
at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf [hereinafter "Model Law and
Guide"].
2 Id at
1.

175

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

1

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 8
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

foreign nations (1) to communicate with one another, (2) to enable them to
recognize foreign insolvency proceedings, and (3) to open their doors to foreign
representatives (i.e., administrators of foreign insolvency proceedings). 3
Allowing the lack of coordination among foreign courts and administrators to
persist would not only increase the likelihood that insolvent debtors would
fraudulently hide their assets, but would also gravely diminish "the possibility
of rescuing financially viable businesses and saving jobs."4 Therefore, by
laying down such a harmonized framework, the UNCITRAL hopes that the
Model Law, when adopted by various States (i.e., incorporated into their
national laws), will allow foreign courts and administrators to avoid these
dangers by facilitating the process of arriving at solutions that would promote
international trade and investment, while at the same time keeping the best
interests of both the creditors and the debtor in mind.5 Despite providing a
framework that would ensure predictability, the Model Law "respects the
differences among national procedural laws and does not attempt a substantive
unification of insolvency law." 6 A nation that adopts the Model Law would
maintain its substantive insolvency law while giving aid to other nations
procedurally so that the insolvency laws of other nations could be carried out
without any international barriers. However, public policy considerations might
arise when the non-uniform insolvency laws of other nations are allowed to be
enforced procedurally around the globe. Article 6 of the Model Law confronted
this concern.
Article 6 of the Model Law, known as the "public policy exception,"
provides: "Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an
action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the
public policy of this State."7 So in spite of the fact that the Model Law is
supposed to make the recognition of foreign proceedings much easier, there is
an appreciation that a nation would be unwilling to recognize a foreign
proceeding if it patently violates that nation's public policy. If various nations
do have different public policies, would it not then make the goal of providing
and carrying out a harmonized and predictable framework impracticable? What
would happen if an insolvency proceeding taking place in State A is brought by
a foreign representative to State B to be recognized, and the latter State believes
it to violate an aspect of its domestic public policy? Would this not hinder the
cooperation and coordination among foreign courts and administrators? Would

3
4

5
6
7

See id. at T 3.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at art. 6.
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the effects of the Model Law's implementation not be astonishingly
unpredictable if a court can refuse the recognition of a foreign proceeding on the
grounds that it contravenes some part of its public policy while that same
proceeding does not violate the public policy of the nation where the proceeding
is taking place? Would this not then foster the environment of irregularity that
the Model Law was supposed to overcome? How should the courts interpret the
"public policy exception" that would carry out the goals of predictability,
harmony, and fairness in the recognition of foreign proceedings?
Recognizing the issues just raised, it is without any doubt that the
UNCITRAL chose to use the word "manifestly" in the text of Article 6
purposely. The word "manifestly" is used deliberately in order "to emphasize
that public policy exceptions should be interpreted restrictively and that article 6
is only intended to be invoked under exceptional circumstances concerning
matters of fundamental importance for the enacting State."' Therefore, the
UNCITRAL expects that the refusal of recognizing a foreign insolvency
proceeding would be rarely used. 9 UNCITRAL recommends, then, that among
considering other competing interests, the court should interpret Article 6 in
such a way as to strike a balance between "general public policy goals" and "the
goals of insolvency and predictability in commercial relations."o An issue
arises here because there are nations that interpret their public policy broadly,
while there are others that limit it only to situations where an action would
contravene fundamental principles. Although the Model Law does not provide
an authoritative definition of "public policy" in Article 6, it does favor the
narrow approach of the nations that would limit it only to fundamental
principles." The Model Law recommends that the adopting nations should give
a narrow interpretation to Article 6 by "recogniz[ing] a dichotomy between the
notion of public policy as it applies to domestic affairs, as well as the notion of
public policy as it is used in matters of international cooperation and the
question of recognition of effects of foreign laws." 1 2 If this dichotomy is not
made and public policy is thus interpreted as broadly in the international realm
as it is at the domestic level, then international cooperation among foreign
courts and administrators will surely suffer.13 Therefore, in order to encourage

S

Id. at

89.

Id. at 20.
10 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON
INSOLVENCY LAW 120 (2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/0580722 Ebook.pdf [hereinafter "Legislative Guide"].
" Model Law and Guide, supranote 1, at 87.
12 Id. at 88.
13 id
9
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international coordination, the Model Law posits that public policy should be
narrowly limited to interpret a nation's fundamental principles such as
constitutional guarantees and protections.1 4 Other instances of exclusion would
be in areas such as "foreign tax claims, fines and penalties, claims relating to
personal injury, [and] claims relating to negligence and gambling debts.""
Moreover, overriding the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings for the
protection of public policy interests would be understandable to safeguard the
environment, public health and safety, and to prevent abuse against the debtor. 16
For the reasons of cultivating a cross-border environment of predictability,
harmony, fairness, cooperation, and coordination, the courts should keep in
mind the principles of comity and reciprocity when it comes to interpreting
Article 6 and other provisions of the Model Law.
As of February 2010, only a handful of nations have adopted the
Model Law and have incorporated it into their respective national insolvency
laws: Eritrea (1998), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Japan (2000),
Montenegro (2002), Northern Ireland and the British Virgin Islands (2003),
Poland (2003), Romania (2003), Serbia (2004), the United States (2005), Great
Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), Colombia (2006), South Korea (2006),
Slovenia (2007), Australia (2008), and Mauritius (2009). 17
It is the purpose of this note to provide a case study of how the courts
in the United States have interpreted the "public policy exception" in their
respective legislations. There will be an analysis of cases where the courts have
either denied or granted recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings when the
claimants have objected to procedures they believe are "manifestly contrary" to
the public policy of the United States. By conducting such an analysis of how
these courts have dealt with the "public policy exception," the ultimate goal is
to see whether the courts of the United States have been consistent in their
interpretation and application of the "the public policy exception." This way,
we will see whether the courts, in practice, have actualized the Model Law's
goal of providing a harmonized and predictable pathway towards dealing with
cross-border insolvencies. By conducting such a survey, we will see how the
courts of the United States have contributed to the analysis of the public policy
considerations in international insolvency law in their own unique and rich
ways. Thus, this case study is relevant due to the fact that if courts interpret and

14
15
16

Id. at 87.
Legislative Guide, supranote 10, at 251.
Id. at 86-87.

Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Model
Feb. 15. 2010).
17

status.html

(last visited
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apply the public policy exception broadly and loosely, the provision will
indubitably become a significant obstacle to granting recognition or relief to
representatives of foreign proceedings who seek aid from U.S. courts. Under
this type of approach, Congress' major intent in adopting the Model Law (i.e.,
to facilitate communication and aid between U.S. courts and foreign courts in
international bankruptcy proceedings) would no doubt be completely frustrated.
Part I of the Note will provide a discussion of Chapter 15. This section
will detail how Chapter 15 was created to adopt the provisions of the Model
Law. The discussion will use the legislative history of the new chapter of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to show Congress' intent to incorporate the spirit of the
Model Law in order to remedy the procedural limitations that were in place
before the adoption. Part I will also show how the legislature wanted the federal
courts to interpret the public policy exception, which is situated in § 1506 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, narrowly and only to the most fundamental public
policies of the United States. But this inevitably leads to an important question:
What is considered to be a fundamental American public policy that would be
violated when a foreign proceeding is recognized? In other words, what are the
conditions and circumstances in which a bankruptcy court or another federal
court would declare a foreign proceeding as being manifestly contrary to the
public policy of the United States?
Parts II and III attempt to answer this question. Part II focuses on four
cases where the courts have recognized foreign proceedings over objections
made under § 1506. The courts in each case held the recognition of foreign
proceedings over various objections under § 1506 - even those that may seem,
at first, to be a fundamental American public policy. The courts in these cases
show how narrowly the courts have applied the public policy exception when it
comes to recognizing a foreign proceeding.
Part III focuses on a single case that was decided by the bankruptcy
court of the Eastern District of New York in August of 2009. The case is
crucial as it is the first case that has been found to violate a fundamental
American public policy under the meaning of § 1506. This section will provide
a detailed analysis of the case to show what the bankruptcy court found to be a
fundamental American public policy that will be violated if relief was granted.
It is hoped that by providing this analysis, the reader will see how the
bankruptcy court distinguished some of the cases mentioned in Part II while still
applying the public policy exception narrowly.
Finally, Part IV will conclude that the United States courts have
narrowly interpreted § 1506 and, therefore, have stayed true not only to
Congress' legislative intent, but also to the spirit of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.
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I. CHAPTER 15 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE
Chapter 15, which incorporated most of the provisions of the Model
Law, was added to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on October 17, 2005.18 It was
part of a set of reforms known as the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Act of 2005 (BAPCA). Chapter 15 replaced 11 U.S.C. § 304.19
While § 304 was "enacted in 1978 to provide specific procedures by which a
representative in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding could obtain relief in U.S.
courts to facilitate the foreign proceeding," 20 there is a reason why Chapter 15
superseded it:
While § 304 afforded bankruptcy courts substantial flexibility
to fashion remedies in order to foster principles of
international comity and respect for the judgments of other
countries, it nevertheless was limited in scope. Filing of a §
304 petition "did not initiate a normal bankruptcy case," nor
was it the exclusive remedy for a foreign representative
seeking the assistance of U.S. courts. Thus, there was no
centralized forum for addressing requests for U.S. judicial
relief in connection with reign proceedings, and jurisprudence
developed on a case-by-case basis. Chapter 15 changes that,
centralizing initial requests for comity and cooperation in the
U.S. bankruptcy courts and setting forth simple... procedures
for foreign representatives seeking comity or cooperation

from U.S. courts. 21
Therefore, Chapter 15 replaced § 304 and was enacted into the
Bankruptcy Code to provide easier and more predictable procedures for U.S.
courts. Chapter 15 also aids the courts in recognizing foreign proceedings, all in

Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, Overview of Chapter 15 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, 82
AM. BANK. L.J. 269, 270 (Spring 2008).
19 See SALLY MCDONALD HENRY, THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE: CASES, DEVELOPMENTS, AND
PRACTICE INSIGHTS SINCE BAPCA 357 (2007).
20 Ranney-Marinelli, supra note
18, at 269.
21 Id. at 269-70. See also Aaron L. Hammer & Matthew E. McClintock,
UnderstandingChapter 15
of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Everything You Need to Know About Cross-Border
Insolvency Legislation in the United States, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 257, 262-3 (Spring 2008)
(stating that unlike § 304, "Chapter 15 sets forth a comprehensive framework for addressing crossborder insolvency cases, including providing for the recognition of a wider variety of foreign
proceedings, allowing representatives of foreign insolvency proceedings to have direct access to the
U.S. court system, and allowing for the commencement of full-blown bankruptcy cases under
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code").
18
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the hopes of promoting comity and cooperation, which the Model Law thought
to be extremely important in solving cases of cross-border insolvency.
Under Chapter 15, a foreign representative can file a petition to obtain
recognition of a foreign proceeding in order to obtain aid from the courts of the
United States. 22 Once the petition is filed, 23 the case begins. However, at this
point, before recognition is granted, the foreign representative does not enjoy
"the vast majority of rights. . .and benefits under Chapter 15."24 The court, in
which the foreign representative has brought its petition for recognition, must
grant recognition of a foreign proceeding when three criteria have been met: (1)
there is, in fact, a foreign proceeding (whether a main proceeding or non-main
proceeding); (2) the foreign representative applying for recognition is a person
25
or body; and (3) the petition fulfills the requirements listed in § 1515.
Once
there is recognition, "the foreign representative earns the power to bring a
number of actions, including actions to avoid preferences, fraudulent transfers,
wrongful setoffs and improper post-petition transfers."26 If the foreign
proceeding is a non-main proceeding, however, "the court must be satisfied that
such an action relates to assets that should be administered in the foreign
nomnain proceeding." 27 There is, however, one caveat to granting recognition
of a foreign proceeding and providing relief: it must be subject to § 1506, better
known as "the public policy exception." 28
Section 1506 provides: "Nothing in this chapter prevents the court
from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States." 29 It is important
to note that the wording of this provision is remarkably similar to that of Article
6 of the Model Law. The reason why this is so is due to the fact that the U.S.
Congress intended for § 1506 to mirror Article 6 of the Model Law:
This provision follows the
standard in UNCITRAL
interpreted on a consistent
The word 'manifestly' in

Model Law article [6] exactly, is
texts, and has been narrowly
basis in courts around the world.
international usage restricts the

Ranney-Marinelli, supranote 18, at 280.
Filing a petition for recognition is subject to the requirements enlisted in 11 U.S.C. § 1515.
24 Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 18, at 280-1. See also Henry, supra
note 19, at 357 (stating that a
foreign representative receives "much broader powers" once a foreign proceeding is recognized).
25 See 11 U.S.C. §
1517(a).
26 Henry, supranote 19, at 357. See also 11
U.S.C. § 1521.
27 Henry, supranote 19, at 357. See also 11
U.S.C. § 1523(b).
28 See 11 U.S.C. §
1517(a).
29 11 U.S.C. §
1506.
22
23
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public policy exception to the most fundamental policies of
the United States.30
Here, Congress makes it clear that the public policy exception should
be interpreted narrowly and that a court can deny recognition of a foreign
proceeding or withhold relief on public policy grounds only if granting such
recognition or relief would violate a fundamental U.S. public policy. Besides
interpreting the public policy exception narrowly, the courts must also interpret
the provision in an international context rather than a national one.31
A foreign representative is not required to show that a U.S. public
policy will not be violated when filing a petition for recognition or relief in a
U.S. court; it is up to either an interested party or the court to raise such an
issue.3 2 "Thus, bankruptcy judges are at the front line of protecting public
policy interests, and may be the first line of defense for creditors who are too
small or disorganized to raise public policy objections on this own."33 Although
courts have the power to protect public policy interests, they have, to date, been
hesitant to refuse recognition of foreign proceedings on public policy basis.3 4
"At least one court, however, has explicitly noted that recognition of a foreign
proceeding is subject to § 1506's public policy considerations." 3 5 To date, there
have been a handful of cases where the courts have dealt with § 1506 - each in
its own way contributing to the development of the role of public policy in
international insolvency law in the United States.
II. CASES THAT HAVE GRANTED RECOGNITION OVER PUBLIC
POLICY OBJECTIONS

A. In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation 36
In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation was one of the first cases

SH.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109 (2005).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (providing that "[iln interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its
international origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions").
32 See John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Lesson
From Maritime Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L 253, 259 (Spring 2007).
31

33

-id.

34 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 154:9 (3d ed. 2009).
35 Id. (citing In re Oversight and Control Com'n of Avanzit, SA., 385 B.R. 525, 532 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
36 In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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that interpreted and applied § 1506 of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to the ban of
ephedra, a stimulant derived from mostly shrubby plants of the genus Ephedra,
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in 2004, a Canadian company by the
name of Muscletech marketed products in the United States that contained
ephedra.3 7 "Some of the consumers suffered severe injuries, such as heart
attacks and strokes, and eventually more than thirty civil actions for personal
injuries and wrongful deaths allegedly caused by ephedra were filed against
Muscletech in state and federal courts in the United States." 38 Muscletech, in
early 2006, brought an insolvency proceeding in the Ontario Supreme Court.
That court appointed a Monitor that appeared in the court at the Southern
District of New York ("S.D.N.Y.") to serve as the foreign representative of the
Ontario Supreme Court. The S.D.N.Y. court granted the Monitor's motion to
have the court recognize the insolvency proceeding in Canada as a "foreign
main proceeding."3 9 Back in Canada, the Monitor and other interested parties
negotiated a claims resolution procedure in order to quickly evaluate all credit
claims, including the plaintiffs in the Muscletech actions in the United States,
who had filed claims and appeared in the insolvency proceeding in Canada.40
Although the Ontario court approved of the claims resolution procedure with the
consent of the majority of claimants, four claimants filed oppositions against
such an order. The S.D.N.Y. court granted the Monitor's motion to recognize
the Ontario court's approval of the claims resolution procedure. However, it
was subject to the Ontario court approving some amendments to the claims
resolution procedure "designed to assure greater clarity and procedural
fairness." 4 1 The Ontario court then approved these amendments to the claims
resolution procedure. The S.D.N.Y. court then finally granted the Monitor's
motion to recognize and enforce the Ontario court's order approving the
amended claims resolution procedure and, thus, granting recognition of the
foreign main proceeding in Canada.
The S.D.N.Y. court addressed the four objections aruging that granting
recognition of the foreign proceeding in Canada would violate U.S. public

37

Id. at 334.

Id. The federal cases were first consolidated and transferred to the court at the Southern District
of New York. The state cases were later transferred to the same court and consolidated with the
federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
39 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)
(providing that a foreign main proceeding "means a foreign
proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests). Center of
main interests (COMI) analysis is a hot issue in international insolvency law. Compare In Re
SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), with In re Stearns High-Grade Structured
CreditStrategiesMaster Fund,Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
40 In re Ephedra, 349 B.R. at 334.
38

41

d
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policy. The four objectors stated that the claims resolution procedure would
deny them due process and trial by jury. The amended claims resolution
procedure "provide[s] for mandatory mediation and, if the mediation results in a
plan approved by specified majorities of creditors, for the estimation and
liquidation of the remaining claims by a Claims Officer appointed by the
Ontario Court." 42
The S.D.N.Y. court found the objectors' argument
concerning due process frivolous since the amendments "entirely cured" the
problems that were raised by the pre-amended claims resolution procedure.43
The S.D.N.Y. court similarly denied the objectors' argument
concerning trial by jury. The court held that "neither § 1506 nor any other law
prevents a United States court from giving recognition and enforcement to a
foreign insolvency procedure for liquidating claims simply because the
procedure alone does not include a right to jury."" The court looked at the
legislative history of the public policy exception in the Bankruptcy Code and
stated that since it was based on the Model Law, the provision should be
interpreted restrictively. In determining whether the denial of a trial by jury in a
foreign proceeding would be "manifestly contrary" to a fundamental public
policy of the United States, the court turned to how other federal courts have
dealt with the issue. The court found that prior decisions by other federal courts
did not invalidate foreign judgments against U.S. citizens in foreign places
where the concept of a trial by jury is unknown.45 While the court
acknowledged that the trial by jury is an important constitutional right, it stated
that "the notion that a fair and impartial verdict cannot be rendered in the
absence of a jury trial defies the experience of most of the civilized world." 46
Therefore, according to the court, recognition of a foreign proceeding would not
be denied when the foreign court provides a "fair and impartial proceeding." 47
Since the Ontario court approved the amended claims resolution procedure and
it, thus, "plainly affords claimants a fair and impartial proceeding[,] [n]othing

42

Id. at 335.

Id. Some of the key problems of the Ontario court's order approving the pre-amended claims
resolution procedure were that a Claims Officer could refuse evidence and that he could liquidate
claims without giving interested parties the opportunity to be heard.
44 Id. at 335-6.
45 See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195, 202-3 (2d Cir.
1987) (affirming district court's finding that Indian courts were adequate forums despite the fact that
there was an absence of juries).
46 In re Ephedra ProductsLiability Litigation, 349 B.R. at 337. The reader must keep in mind that
although the result might be different in a purely domestic case, this is a case concerning the
recognition of a foreign proceeding, so the principle of comity is prevalent behind the court's
reasoning.
43

47

d
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more is required by § 1506 or any other law."48 Also, the court determined that
the objectors' arguments were grounded in the concern of having their
bargaining position lessen in negotiating their claims in front of a claims officer
instead of a jury. The court determined that the "[d]eprivation of such
bargaining advantage hardly rises to the level of imposing on plaintiffs some
fundamental unfairness." 49 For these reasons, the S.D.N.Y. court granted the
recognition of the amended claims resolution procedure and the foreign
proceeding in Canada.
B. In re lida5 0
In this case, a debtor, an individual who happens to be a Japanese
citizen, was declared bankrupt under the Japanese bankruptcy law. Another
Japanese citizen was appointed as a trustee of the debtor's estate in the Japanese
bankruptcy proceeding. This proceeding is similar, albeit with some procedural
differences, to a Chapter 7 case in the United States in that it applies to both
individual and corporate insolvencies seeking liquidation. 5 1 At the time of the
commencement of the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor had assets in
Hawaii. He owned all of the stocks of three Hawaiian corporations. "The
Hawaii Corporations held several valuable property interests, including
substantial ownership interests in two limited partnerships that owned and
operated the Kahala Mandarin Oriental Resort and the Kona Village Resort, two
luxury hotels in Hawaii." 52 Before the commencement of the Japanese
bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor was an officer and director of the Hawaiian
corporations. However, there were other officers and directors as well,
including Henry Fong.53 Despite having assets in Hawaii, the debtor and his
corporations did not have any creditors in the United States.54 As part of his
duty to liquidate and administer the debtor's estate assets in the Japanese
bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee became the sole shareholder. Pursuant to
being the sole shareholder, the trustee took steps to gain control of the Hawaiian
corporations. The trustee went to Fong to show proof of the former's
appointment as trustee. Fong consulted the legal advice of both the counsel of
the Hawaiian corporations and the debtor's personal lawyers. Fong was advised

48

id

49

-d

50

In re lida, 377 B.R. 243 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2007).
See id. at 247 n.2.
id

51
52
53

Id. at 248. Fong was a treasurer and a vice-president of at least two of the corporations.

54

Id. at 247.
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to accept the trustee's authority as the single shareholder, which he eventually
did. " After this development, the trustee continued to take steps in
restructuring the management of the Hawaiian corporations. The articles of
incorporation for these corporations provided that they could have one officer
and one director if there was only one shareholder. Furthermore, "[t]he by-laws
of the Hawaii Corporations permitted the shareholders to remove any and all of
the directors by a vote of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote. The bylaws also allowed the directors to remove and replace any officer at any time." 5 6
The by-laws also provided that shareholders should remove and replace any
officers at an annual or special shareholder meeting. However, the shareholders
were allowed to replace and remove an officer without holding an annual or
special meeting "so long as all the shareholders consented in writing, and such
written consent was filed with or made part of the minutes of the board of
directors or the corporate records."17
In January and March of 2005, the trustee, in a series of written
consents, appointed Fong as the sole director of the corporations. Fong then
removed all the rest of the officers of the corporations as the sole director and
his actions were approved by the trustee in the shareholder consents." The
Japanese bankruptcy court entered an order in September 2005 which
authorized the trustee to sell one of the resorts and also to "exercise all powers
of decision with respect to the stock of all companies whose stock the debtor
owned."59
After seven months, since the sale of the last of the two resorts and
after one year, the trustee exercised his right as the single shareholder to remove
the debtor and other officers from the board of the corporations, the debtor
brought a complaint against the trustee in a Hawaiian state court in April
2006.60 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that would declare the
debtor as the sole shareholder of the Hawaiian corporations and would reinstate
the debtor as the director of these corporations.61 The complaint also sought an
injunction against the trustee that would forbid the trustee from removing the
debtor as the director of the corporations and also to enjoin the trustee from
distributing the proceeds from the sales of the Hawaiian corporations' assets. 62

55Id.
56

at 248.

id.

Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 249.
59 Id. at 249-50.
60 Id. at 250.
61 Id.
62 id.
5
5

186

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol9/iss1/8

12

Shahid: The Public Policy Exception: Has § 1506 Been a Significant Obstac
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
A few months later, in September 2006, the Japanese bankruptcy court issued
an order authorizing the trustee to "(1) exercise the shareholders' rights to
remove and replace directors and officers; (2) distribute any proceeds from the
liquidation of assets or any remaining assets without notifying the debtor or
obtaining his consent; and (3) take such action as was necessary to ensure that
the" order is recognized and given full legal effect in both the state and federal
courts of the United States.63
Pursuant to the order of the Japanese bankruptcy court, the trustee filed
a Chapter 15 petition in June 2006 in order to get the Japanese bankruptcy
proceeding to be recognized as a foreign main proceeding. The debtor filed an
opposition to the petition for recognition on the grounds that even though the
Japanese bankruptcy proceeding is a foreign main proceeding; recognition of
that proceeding would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States. 64 "Specifically, the debtor contended that the Foreign Representative
[the trustee] was required to obtain permission from the United States
Bankruptcy Court under chapter 15 or its predecessor § 304 before acting in the
January and March 2005 to remove the [debtor] as director[] and officer[] of the
Hawaii Corporations." 65 In July 2006, the U.S. bankruptcy court issued an
order that allowed the trustee, as the foreign representative, to commence an
ancillary proceeding that would allow it to seek relief under §§ 151966, 152067
and 152168 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 69 The trustee then soon removed the
declaratory judgment action from the Hawaiian state court to the federal
bankruptcy court. Thereafter, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that the debtor filed the complaint in order "to circumvent
Japanese bankruptcy law and the orders of the Japanese bankruptcy court and to
challenge the authority of and actions taken by the Foreign Representative as
shareholder of the Hawaii Corporations in his efforts to administer and liquidate
the Japanese bankruptcy estate."7 0 The debtor opposed the motion to dismiss,
reiterating his public policy argument by stating that the trustee had no right to
remove the debtor as a director of the Hawaiian corporations since both federal

63

id.
Id. at 251.
65 -id.
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 1519 (listing types of relief that may be granted upon the filing
of the petition for
recognition).
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (providing a list of what happens once the bankruptcy
court recognizes a
foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding).
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (listing types of relief that may be granted once
the bankruptcy court
recognizes a foreign proceeding, whether it is main or not).
69 In re lida,377
at 251.
7o Id. at 252.
64
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bankruptcy and state laws required the trustee to obtain an order from a court
within the United States officially recognizing his status as a trustee in the
Japanese bankruptcy proceeding.
In November 2006, the bankruptcy court,
treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, determined
that the trustee had the authority to remove and replace the debtor, that he had a
right to do so as the sole shareholder; that he complied with the Hawaiian state
courts and the by-laws of the corporations when removing and replacing the
debtor; that the court was compelled by the principle of comity to recognize the
Japanese bankruptcy proceeding; and, finally, that nothing in the Hawaiian state
law and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code "required the Foreign Representative to
obtain a federal or Hawaii state court order recognizing his authority to act in
his capacity as trustee in the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding." 72 Therefore, the
bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the debtor's complaint with prejudice.73 The debtor then appealed to
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (B.A.P.) of the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the B.A.P. affirmed the bankruptcy court's opinion. The
B.A.P. provided analysis under both § 304 and Chapter 15 because when the
trustee exercised his authority in removing and replacing the debtor, § 304 was
in effect; but when the trustee received recognition, Chapter 1574 was in effect.
Although the B.A.P. determined that Chapter 15 should apply in the case and
that the case law under § 304 would not serve as precedent for Chapter 15 cases,
§ 304 case law should nevertheless be informative in Chapter 15 analysis,
especially when it comes to comity.75 In addressing the debtor's public policy
argument, the B.A.P. stated that § 1506 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was to be
interpreted narrowly and should only be invoked when "the most fundamental
policies of the United States" were violated.76 The B.A.P. rejected the debtor's
argument that the trustee needed to obtain an order from either the bankruptcy
court or the state law recognizing his status, rights, and privileges as trustee in
the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding before removing and replacing any officer.
The B.A.P. held that a foreign representative need not obtain a prior order from
either a bankruptcy court or state court recognizing his status as a trustee of a
71

id.

72

id.

73

id.

Chapter 15 applies to all cases from October 17, 2005 and onwards, as stated above.
In re lida, 377 B.R. at 256. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5). That section provided:
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall be
guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate,
consistent with (5) comity... .
76 In re lida, 377 B.R. at 259.
74
7
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foreign bankruptcy proceeding before exercising control over assets in the
United States.
As a result, the trustee here can avail himself of the reliefs
listed in § 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In other words, the bankruptcy court, deciding to grant grief
under §§ 1521(a) and (b), simply gives the foreign
representative the green light to proceed with his or her duties
as trustee, provided that the United States creditors' interests
are sufficiently protected. In this case, there are no United
States creditors with interests to protect.
Hence, there are not any fundamental public policy considerations to
be worried about in granting recognition to the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding
as a foreign main proceeding.
C. In re Ernst & Young, Inc.
In In re Ernst & Young, Inc., the Friedmans, Israeli citizens living in
Canada, moved to California.
The Friedmans formed the Klytie's
Developments, Inc. (KDI) in March 2005 under the laws of Canada. The
registered office for KDI was in Alberta, Canada. The Friedmans owned a
substantial amount of stock in KDI with the remainder left in the ownership of
Sharkey, a resident of Denver, Colorado. "In July, 2005, KDI formed and
registered Klytie's Developments, LLC (KD/CO) in Colorado" for which
Sharkey was responsible for operating under the Friedmans' supervision and
direction. 0 Through both KDI and KD/CO, the Friedmans and Sharkey sought
investments in a fund in order to finance and purchase real estate developments
around the world. Almost $8 million were raised by investors located in
Canada, the United States, and Israel. Money that was raised by KD/CO was
stored in U.S. banks and a considerable amount of the funds were transferred to
the Friedmans and KDI. However, in early 2006, the Securities Commissioner
of Colorado commenced an investigation of KDI and KD/CO, after which the
Coloradan commissioner forwarded his findings to the Securities Commission
in Alberta, which started its own investigation. In October 2006, the Coloradan
commissioner filed a complaint against the two entities, the Friedmans and
Sharkey in Denver, Colorado. The court there ordered the defendants to refrain

Id. at 263.
Id. at 259.
79 In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2008).
so Id. at 774.
7

71
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"from selling interests in the fund, and from brokering, dealing, or selling
securities in Colorado. The defendants were also prohibited from dissipating
assets or destroying records of KDI or KD/CO."'l Subsequently, the Alberta
Securities Commission commenced its own action against the KDI and the
Friedmans in Canada and obtained an order that froze all money in their
accounts in two Canadian banks. The Friedmans then entered into a settlement
agreement with the Albertan commission "under which KDI and the Friedmans
admitted to committing fraud, agreed to pay [the Alberta Securities
Commission] $220,000 (Can.), and agreed to refrain from work in the securities
field for 25 years." 8 2 However, that was not an end to the Friedmans' and
Sharkey's legal troubles. In June 2007, some plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
federal district court in Colorado. The defendants moved to stay that action
pending the outcome of the legal proceedings in Canada and also the outcome
of the criminal indictments against one of the Friedmans and Sharkey that was
entered by the grand jury of Jefferson County, Colorado in October 2007.
In August 2007, the Court of Queen's Bench in Alberta, District of
Calgary issued an order which appointed Ernst & Young as Receiver for KDI,
KD/CO, and the Friedmans. Among other orders, the Court of Queen's Bench
"authorized the Receiver to seek recognition of its orders and to seek 'aid and
recognition' of courts in the United States."83 The Receiver then filed a petition
for recognition of the Canadian foreign proceeding as a "foreign main
proceeding" due to the fact that KDI was incorporated in Alberta, Canada, the
location of the entities' operations and principal assets. Furthermore, "the
[p]etition states recognition as a foreign main proceeding is necessary to assist
the Receiver in investigating and pursuing assets of KDI and its related entities
located in Colorado and elsewhere in the United States."8 4 Alternatively, the
Receiver argued for the Canadian proceeding to be recognized as a "foreign
nonmain proceeding." 5 The Coloradan commissioner and the plaintiffs,
however, objected to the Receiver's request for the Canadian proceeding to be
recognized as a foreign main proceeding. The commissioner and the plaintiffs
contended that the defendants'/debtors' center of main interests (COMI) were
not in Alberta but instead in Colorado since KD/CO had the primary
responsibility for the fraud. The plaintiffs also alleged that the money

s Id. at 775.
82 id.
83
84

Id. at 776.
id.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1502(5) (providing that a foreign non-main proceeding "means a foreign
proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an
establishment).
8'
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channeled through that KD/CO went through U.S. banks. Furthermore, they
argued that granting recognition of the Canadian proceeding as the foreign main
proceeding would run contrary to the U.S. public policy since (1) it will harm
the recovery efforts already under way in Colorado; (2) it will not provide relief
against all parties since Sharkey is not a party in that proceeding; (3) the
plaintiffs' rights will be undermined because the proceeding will allow the
Receiver to take funds held by the Colorado court in order to distribute it under
Canadian law; and (4) the cost of pursuing assets sustained by the Receiver will
go beyond the claims of creditors in the United States.86
The bankruptcy court of the federal district court in Colorado had to
determine whether the Canadian proceeding was a foreign main proceeding
under a COMI analysis and if it was, whether such a proceeding would be
"manifestly contrary" to a fundamental public policy of the United States.
The court first conducted a COMI analysis to determine whether the
Canadian proceeding was a foreign main proceeding. The court employed the
COMI analysis used by Judge Lifland in the In re Bear Sterns case. In that
case, since the Bankruptcy Code did not provide any help in determining what
type of evidence is required to rebut the presumption that the debtor's COMI is
its place of registration or incorporation, Judge Lifland provided various factors
that could be relevant to such a determination. These factors include:
[T]he location of the debtor's headquarters; the location of
those who actually manage the debtor (which conceivably
could be headquarters of a holding company); the location of
the debtor's primary assets; the location of the majority of the
debtor's creditors or of a majority of the creditors who would
be affected by the case; and/or the jurisdiction whose law
would apply to most disputes.
After conducting a COMI analysis under these factors, the court
determined that the Canadian foreign proceeding was a foreign main
proceeding.
Since the court determined that the Canadian proceeding was a foreign
main proceeding, the court had to determine whether recognizing it as such
would make § 1506 applicable. The court stated that § 1506 should be
interpreted narrowly and restricted only to "the most fundamental policies of the
United States [that] are at risk."88 The court rejected the parties' argument that

86
87
88

In re Ernst & Young Inc., 383 B.R. at 778.
In re Bear Sterns High-Grade StructuredCreditStrategiesMasterFund, Ltd., 374 B.R. at 128.
In re Ernst & Young Inc., 383 B.R. at 78 1.
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allowing the Canadian proceeding to be recognized as the main proceeding
would make the investors in the United States receive less (since investors from
Canada and Israel will also be included here) than they would if these local
investors received from the Colorado courts. The court found this argument to
be unpersuasive since "[a]ll wronged investors should share in the assets
accumulated in the Receivership Proceeding, regardless of nationality or
locale."8 9 The court also rejected the objecting parties' argument that allowing
the Canadian proceeding to be recognized as the foreign main proceeding would
make the Coloradan investors receive less during distribution since the costs
sustained by the Receiver in such a proceeding would deplete the debtors' assets
significantly. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that the "[c]osts of
liquidation are a reality, whether through a foreign proceeding, or through a
United States bankruptcy case." 90 For these reasons, the court held that granting
recognition of the Canadian proceeding as the foreign main proceeding would
not be "manifestly contrary" to the public policy of the United States. Hence,
just because the local investors would receive less in an international proceeding
than they would in a domestic proceeding and because the costs of liquidation
will deplete the debtors' assets, the public policy considerations of § 1506 will
not necessarily be invoked.
D. In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments91
This is an interesting January 2010 case that arose out of the recent
global financial crisis. Specifically, the case arose out of the crisis in Canada's
non-bank sponsored Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) market. 92 The
Canadian ABCP market froze in August 2007. Investors in the Canadian ABCP
market lost confidence in the transparency of the market which was brought on
by news of the widespread defaults on the sub-prime mortgages in the United
States. These investors were afraid that the some of the assets that backed the
ABCP market had substantial exposure to sub-prime mortgages. "With no new
investment, no reinvestment, and no liquidity funding available, coupled with
the timing mismatch between the short-term ABCP and the longer-term

89 Id.
90
91

Id.
--- B.R. ---- , 2010 WL 20603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).

92 For a background on the Canadian ABCP market crisis, see generally Lou
Brzezinski, Canada's
ABCP
Crisis
The
Aftermath,
Blaney
McMurty
LLP,
available
at
http://www.blaney.com/resources/contentfiles/blanev/Resources/article/canadas-abcp-crisis-theaftermath/pdf/canadas-abcp-crisis 2009 LB.pdf.
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underlying assets, payments due on the ABCP could not be made." 93 Soon, a
restructuring plan was devised by stakeholders. 94 Besides providing for marketwide transparency, restructuring of the transactions of "leveraged super senior"
swaps, the plan provided for a non-debtor, third-party release and injunction.
This release and injunction would protect asset providers 95 from "liability and
actions on account of any and all past, present and future claims, rights,
interests, actions, rights of indemnity, liabilities, demands, duties, injuries,
damages, expenses, fees or causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature in any
way related to the third-party ABCP market in Canada." 96 The release was
included into the plan because the asset providers were seen as being crucial in
the restructuring of the market. It would also protect them from the claims of
investors for indemnity or contribution claims after the implementation of the
plan. 97 In the Canadian proceedings, the issue of the non-debtor, third party
debtor release and injunction were the issue before the Canadian courts. Both
the Ontario Court and the Ontario Court of Appeals in June and August 2008,
respectively, held that the release and injunction were properly included in the
plan and that the plan was "fair and reasonable." 98
Ernst & Young, Inc., the court-appointed monitor and financial advisor
to the plan, filed a Chapter 15 petition in order to have the Canadian
proceedings recognized as the foreign main proceeding. The monitor acted so
due to the express provisions in the plan that "request[ed] aid, recognition and
assistance by U.S. courts in carrying out the terms of the orders." 99 Although
there was no party claiming that the enforcement of the non-debtor, third-party
release and injunction would violate a fundamental public policy of the United
States, pursuant to § 1506, the bankruptcy court of the S.D.N.Y. took into
consideration that particular analysis.
The monitor argued "that the third-party non-debtor release and
injunction provisions included in the Plan and Sanction Order should be
enforced in the United States because, if this were a plenary case under chapter

In re Metcalfe, 2010 WL 20603, at *3.
The restructuring of the Canadian ABCP market would become the largest restructuring program
in Canada's history.
9 Among the asset providers that the release applied to were: "Bank of America, N.A., Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Citbank, N.A., Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Merrill
Lynch International, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Swiss Re Financial Products
Corporation, UBS AG and Wachovia Bank N.A. and their respective affiliates." In re Metcalfe,
2010 WL 20603, at *2.
96 In re Metcalfe, 2010 WL 20603, at *5.
97 Id. at *6.
98 Id. at *7.
9 Id.
93
94
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11, such provisions would pass the muster under the rigorous standards for
release and injunction provisions established by the Second Circuit." 100 The
Second Circuit, through its case law, has imposed strict limitations upon the
bankruptcy courts to enforce non-debtor, third-party release and injunction
provisions.101 For example, in In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 102 the
Second Circuit held that since non-debtor, third-party release provisions in plans
of reorganization increase the likelihood of abuse, they should only be enforced
in the rarest of cases.103 Furthermore, in In re Johns-Manville Corp.,10 4 the
Second Circuit severely limited the enforcement of the non-debtor, third party
releases by the bankruptcy courts only when the released claims have a direct
impact on the res of the bankruptcy estate.10 In Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Bailey, 106 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed Manville on other
grounds.1 0 7 Although the Manville case was overruled on other grounds, the
S.D.N.Y. bankruptcy court stated in the case at bar that "[i]t is unclear whether
the circuit panel's decision remains binding law in this Circuit on other issues
decided by the panel - specifically on the jurisdictional limits on a bankruptcy
court's power to approve a third-party non-debtor release and injunction."10
The bankruptcy court further provided that "[e]ven if the circuit panel decision
is not binding, it may nevertheless be persuasive with respect to the
jurisdictional issue." 109 The monitor argued that the standard in Metromedia
was met here because the Canadian courts also applied a rigorous standard in
determining the validity of the non-debtor, third-party release and injunction. 10
Although the bankruptcy court said that it might be so, the standard in Manville
seems to go the other way when applied in a plenary Chapter 11 case. The
bankruptcy court, however, stated that the principles behind the "enforcement of
foreign judgments and comity in chapter 15 cases strongly counsel approval of
enforcement in the United States of the third-party non-debtor release and
injunction provisions included in the Canadian Orders, even if those provisions
could not be entered in a plenary chapter 11 case."n

100 Id. at *8.

101See id.
102
103
104
105
106
107

In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 141-42.
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 66.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).
See id. at 2206.

10

In re Metcalfe, 2010 WL 20603, at *9.

109

Id.

Id. at *8.
n1 Id. at *9.
110
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The bankruptcy court stated that under Chapter 15 analysis, recognition
is limited by the public policy considerations of § 1506. The bankruptcy court
said that the public policy exception of Chapter 15 should be "narrowly
construed." 112 The bankruptcy court declared that even though the Second
Circuit severely restricts a bankruptcy court to enforce non-debtor, third party
releases and injunctions, they are not entirely precluded.113 The bankruptcy
court noted that the Canadian courts that dealt with the issue in this case had
expressed similar concerns before holding the release and injunction to be
valid. 114
The bankruptcy court further stated that comity should be extended to a
foreign common law jurisdiction that has similar procedures to that of the
United States. 115 "The U.S. and Canada share the same common law traditions
and fundamental principles of law. Canadian courts afford creditors a full and
fair opportunity to be heard in a manner consistent with standards of U.S. due
process." 116 Since the issue over the non-debtor, third-party release and
injunction had been litigated and the Canadian courts took into consideration the
concerns that accompany the enforcement of those provisions, the principle of
comity suggests that the bankruptcy court should not question the Canadian
courts who believed that such a provision is necessary in the face of the
Canadian ABCP market crisis. Therefore, § 1506 should "not preclude giving
comity to the Canadian Orders in this case." 1 1 7
III. NOT SO SWEET: IN RE GOLD & HONEY, LTD., THE CASE THAT
FOUND PUBLIC POLICY VIOLATION
In In re Gold & Honey"1 , the bankruptcy court of the Eastern District
of New York ("E.D.N.Y.") refused to recognize an Israeli bankruptcy
proceeding due to the public policy consideration of § 1506. Decided in August
2009, this case is an important breakthrough since it is the first case, and only
case thus far, where a bankruptcy court has refused to recognize a foreign
proceeding due to it being "manifestly contrary to the public policy of the

112

Id. at *11.

113

id

114

id

115See, e.g., In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Intl. Ins. Ltd., Inc., 238 B.R. 25, 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1999). See also United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d
198, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
116 In re Metcalfe, 2010 WL 20603, at *12.
117Id. at *11.
11s 410 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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United States."
The debtors in the case are Gold & Honey LP and Gold & Honey, Ltd.
The former is a New York limited partnership that has an office in Port
Washington, New York. Gold & Honey, Ltd., on the other hand, is a
corporation that was organized under the laws of Israel, is a general partner of
Gold & Honey LP and is a 49.5% equity holder of that partnership. The First
International Bank of Israel (FIBI) is a foreign banking corporation that was
organized under the laws of Israel and was a pre-petition lender to Gold &
Honey LP. In return for the loans, Gold & Honey LP and Gold & Honey, Ltd.
pledged some equipments, machinery, and accounts receivable as collateral
security for repayment of the loans. 119
Around March 2008, FIBI started litigation in Israel and in July 2008,
it seized a large amount of assets of both Gold & Honey LP and Gold & Honey,
Ltd. and started an Israeli receivership proceeding. In September 2008, the
debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition, thereby prompting the automatic stay. In
October 2008, FIBI continued to have a receiver appointed before the Israeli
court for the proceeding. At an October 2008 hearing before the Israeli court,
FIBI stated that the automatic stay did not apply to FIBI as it attempts to gain
control of the property of the bankruptcy estate of the debtors. 120 At the exact
same time, the debtors asked the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of
New York to issue an order that would determine that the automatic say applied
to their "property wherever located and by whomever held, and, in particular, to
the Israeli Receivership Proceeding." 121 FIBI made a special appearance in
which it asserted that it was not within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and
that the Israeli proceeding was also not within its jurisdiction. The bankruptcy
court determined that the automatic stay did apply to debtors' property
everywhere and regardless of who held it. 122 The bankruptcy court further
warned FIBI that if it continued to pursue the Israeli proceeding before the
Israeli court, "it did so at its own peril."1 23 FIBI, however, disregarded the
bankruptcy court's advice and continued to prosecute the Israeli proceeding.
FIBI presented the Israeli court with the stay order of the bankruptcy court,
which prompted the Israeli court to issue an order at the end of October 2008
that refused to give effect to the stay order. 124 In November 2008, the Israeli
court appointed an attorney for FIBI and an accountant as permanent receivers

119

Id. at 362.

120

Id. at 363.
id
id
id
Id. at 364.
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of the Israeli proceeding. 125
In January 2009, FIBI filed a motion for relief pursuant to §§ 362(d)(1)
and (d)(2) to lift the automatic stay. 126 By the end of the month, FIBI filed
petitions for recognition under Chapter 15. FIBI filed the petitions in order to
have the Israeli receivership proceeding recognized as a foreign main
proceeding of the debtors. The bankruptcy court refused to recognize the Israeli
receivership proceeding as a foreign proceeding - whether main or non-main because according to the Bankruptcy Code, the Israeli proceeding is not
collective in nature.127 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court doubted that one of
the receivers of the Israeli proceeding would work in the full interests of the
other creditors since he is employed as an attorney for FIBI at the same time.128
The bankruptcy court also refused to recognize the Israeli proceeding for two
other reasons: "the Receivers were appointed in violation of the automatic stay;
and recognition of the petitions would have an adverse effect on public policy,
pursuant to section 1506." 129
The bankruptcy court found that the receivers were appointed in
violation of the automatic stay since the automatic stay applied as soon as the
debtors filed petitions under Chapter 11. The stay enjoined FIBI from pursuing
the receivership proceeding in Israel, however, FIBI refused to comply with the
stay even when the bankruptcy court strongly advised it to do so. FIBI knew
that the automatic stay applied to the debtors' property everywhere and in the

125

d
Sections 362(d)(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Code provide basis for relief from the automatic
stay. They state:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,
such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest;
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a)
of this section, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (2).
127 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) defines "foreign proceeding" as:
The term "foreign proceeding" means a collective judicial or administrative
proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law
relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets
and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign
court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.
128 In re Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 371 n.17.
129 Id. at 368.
126
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hands of whomever and "[i]t would fly in the face of the Bankruptcy Code for
this Court to recognize the petitions here and authorize the post-petition
appointed Receivers to proceed in the United States when they were appointed
as the result of a knowing and willful violation of the stay by FIBI."130 The
case law of the Second Circuit further entails that a violation of the automatic
stay would make an action void.131 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court provided
that although the Israeli court lifted the stay for FIBI, the bankruptcy court, and
not the Israeli court, had the power to lift the stay and not the Israeli court. 13 2
The bankruptcy court then analyzed whether the recognition of the
Israeli proceeding would violate a fundamental public policy of the United
States pursuant to § 1506. The court provided that in determining whether
recognition of a petition would violate § 1506, the court must apply the
provision narrowly and only to the most fundamental of American public
policies that are at risk.133 The receivers relied on the In re Ernst & Young case
in arguing that the public policy exception should not apply to their case. The
bankruptcy court, however, distinguished that case from the case at bar by
stating that the former case did not involve a fundamental American public
policy. 13 4 The receivers also relied upon the In re Ephedra Products Liability
case. The bankruptcy court also distinguished that case from the case at bar and
stated that although the former case involved a fundamental American right
(i.e., trial by jury), bankruptcy cases usually do not have jury trials. 13 5 Violation
of the automatic stay, however, would make the stay absolutely meaningless.
Recognizing a foreign seizure of a debtor's assets postpetition
would severely hinder United States bankruptcy courts'
abilities to carry out two of the most fundamental policies and
purposes of the automatic stay - namely, preventing one
creditor from obtaining an advantage over other creditors, and
providing for the efficient and orderly distribution of a
debtor's assets to all creditors in accordance with their relative
priorities. 136
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court stated that recognizing the Israeli

130
131
132

id
See, e.g., In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc., 61 B.R. 182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
In re Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 369.

133 See
134
135
136

id. at 372.
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proceeding would only legitimize FIBI's actions and would invite a future
creditor to violate the stay in order to obtain a debtor's assets located outside of
the United States, while at the same time allowing it to receive benefits within
American jurisdiction. 13 7 For this reason, the bankruptcy court held that the
recognition of the Israeli receivership proceeding and its providing of relief
would violate a fundamental American public policy under the meaning of §
1506.
IV. CONCLUSION
The five cases mentioned above illustrate how the courts in the United
States have applied the § 1506 public policy exception when it came to both
recognizing foreign bankruptcy proceedings and providing relief in those cases.
Since Chapter 15 was added to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code less than five years
ago, there was virtually no case law138 on point that would guide the courts
when it came to applying § 1506 to the cases at hand. These courts had to turn
to the legislative intent in Congress' adoption of the Model Law. Both the
legislative intent and Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provide that
when it comes to applying the public policy exception, the courts should
construe that provision narrowly. So the question inevitably arises: Did the
courts in these five cases apply § 1506 narrowly?
Four of the five cases, faced with public policy concerns when
determining whether to grant recognition of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding
and/or when providing relief, concluded that § 1506 should not bar the
recognition of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding or in granting relief in their
respective cases. Although, in these cases, there were legitimate public policy
issues raised, such as the place of the foreign main proceeding not recognizing a
trial by jury, the courts still determined that the fundamental public policies of
the United States were not under threat if the foreign proceeding was recognized
or a petition of relief was granted. Therefore, it is clear that the courts in these
cases interpreted and applied § 1506 narrowly.
The only case where a court found that a fundamental public policy of
the United States was violated under § 1506 was the Gold & Honey case. In
that case, the E.D.N.Y. bankruptcy court held that the Israeli receivership
should not receive any relief since it violated the automatic stay. We are led to
ask whether this case interpreted and applied § 1506 broadly and whether this
may threaten the system of making it easier to grant recognition or relief to

137

See id.

It should be noted, however, that the courts did consult older cases that dealt with the issue of
comity.
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cross-border insolvency proceedings. The interesting thing about this case is
that unlike the other cases mentioned above, the Gold & Honey case focused on
the action of the foreign party seeking assistance. The cases where the courts
found no public policy violations under § 1506 focused upon the procedures and
laws of a foreign jurisdiction (such as the lack of trials by jury in Canada) while
the Gold & Honey case focused upon the behavior of the foreign party seeking
relief.139 Nevertheless, we can conclude that the court did not interpret and
apply § 1506 broadly since it explicitly recognized that the section should be
applied narrowly and that the automatic stay is of such fundamental importance
in U.S. bankruptcy law that in assisting the Israeli receivership, the automatic
stay would be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, finding a public policy
violation under § 1506 would not place similar hurdles to granting recognition
to international insolvency proceeding and relief as was the case when § 304
was the law.
Thus, although courts consult § 1506 when it comes to assisting
international insolvency proceedings in the form of granting recognition and
relief, the five cases above have demonstrated that § 1506 has not been
interpreted nor applied broadly. Based on the cases thus far, § 1506 would not
pose much of a threat in granting recognition or relief when it comes to
international insolvency proceedings.
In other words, § 1506 has been
construed so narrowly by at least four of the five cases that it is safe to assume
that it will not play much of a significant role in granting recognition and relief
to representatives of foreign proceedings. Therefore, these cases demonstrate
how the courts of the United States, when faced with public policy concerns
under § 1506, have stayed true to not only the congressional intent, but also to
the spirit of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

It may be argued that in the Iida case, the debtor claimed that the Japanese trustee did not
officially obtain recognition of his status from state law or a bankruptcy court. Hence, it may be
argued, that the court focused upon the trustee's behavior. This is not the case, however. The issue
in the case was whether the Hawaiian state law and the Bankruptcy Code required such an action
from the trustee. The focus was not so much on the behavior of the trustee, but what the Hawaiian
state law and the Bankruptcy Code entailed. Ultimately, the argument can be made that the court
accepted the trustee's argument that the debtor was seeking to avoid Japanese bankruptcy law,
which the court found to be similar to U.S. bankruptcy law, despite some procedural differences. In
the Gold & Honey case, the court was focused wholly upon the Israeli receivership violating the
automatic stay.
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